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Abstract
We attempt to interpret how adversarially trained
convolutional neural networks (AT-CNNs) recog-
nize objects. We design systematic approaches to
interpret AT-CNNs in both qualitative and quan-
titative ways and compare them with normally
trained models. Surprisingly, we find that adver-
sarial training alleviates the texture bias of stan-
dard CNNs when trained on object recognition
tasks, and helps CNNs learn a more shape-biased
representation. We validate our hypothesis from
two aspects. First, we compare the salience maps
of AT-CNNs and standard CNNs on clean images
and images under different transformations. The
comparison could visually show that the predic-
tion of the two types of CNNs is sensitive to dra-
matically different types of features. Second, to
achieve quantitative verification, we construct ad-
ditional test datasets that destroy either textures or
shapes, such as style-transferred version of clean
data, saturated images and patch-shuffled ones,
and then evaluate the classification accuracy of
AT-CNNs and normal CNNs on these datasets.
Our findings shed some light on why AT-CNNs
are more robust than those normally trained ones
and contribute to a better understanding of adver-
sarial training over CNNs from an interpretation
perspective.
1. Introduction
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have achieved great
success in a variety of visual recognition tasks (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012; Girshick et al., 2014; Long et al., 2015) with
their stacked local connections. A crucial issue is to under-
stand what is being learned after training over thousands or
even millions of images. This involves interpreting CNNs.
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Along this line, some recent works showed that standard
CNNs trained on ImageNet make their predictions rely on
the local textures rather than long-range dependencies en-
coded in the shape of objects (Geirhos et al., 2019; Brendel
& Bethge, 2019; Ballester & de Arau´jo, 2016). Conse-
quently, this texture bias prevents the trained CNNs from
generalizing well on those images with distorted textures
but maintained shape information. Geirhos et al. (2019) also
showed that using a combination of Stylized-ImageNet and
ImageNet can alleviate the texture bias of standard CNNs.
It naturally raises an intriguing question:
Are there any other trained CNNs are more biased towards
shapes?
Recently, normally trained neural networks were found to
be easily fooled by maliciously perturbed examples, i.e., ad-
versarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al.,
2016). To defense the adversarial examples, adversarial
training was proposed; that is, instead of minimizing the
loss function over the clean example, it minimizes almost
worst-case loss over the slightly perturbed examples (Madry
et al., 2018). We name these adversarially trained networks
as AT-CNNs. They were extensively shown to be able to
enhance the robustness, i.e., improving the classification
accuracy over the adversarial examples. Then,
What is learned by adversarially trained CNNs to make it
more robust?
In this work, in order to explore the answer to the above
questions, we systematically design various experiments to
interpret the AT-CNNs and compare them with normally
trained models. We find that AT-CNNs are better at captur-
ing long-range correlations such as shapes, and less biased
towards textures than normally trained CNNs in popular
object recognition datasets. This finding partially explains
why AT-CNNs tends to be more robust than standard CNNs.
We validate our hypothesis from two aspects. First, we
compare the salience maps of AT-CNNs and standard CNNs
on clean images and those under different transformations.
The comparison could visually show that the predictions of
the two CNNs are sensitive to dramatically different types
of features. Second, we construct additional test datasets
that destroy either textures or shapes, such as the style-
transferred version of clean data, saturated images and patch-
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shuffled images, then evaluate the classification accuracy
of AT-CNN and normal CNNs on these datasets. These
sophisticated designed experiments provide a quantitative
comparison between the two CNNs and demonstrate their
biases when making predictions.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to implement
systematic investigation on interpreting the adversarially
trained CNNs, both visually and quantitatively. Our find-
ings shed some light on why AT-CNNs are more robust
than those normally trained ones and also contribute to bet-
ter understanding adversarial training over CNNs from an
interpretation perspective.1
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. We
introduce background knowledge on adversarial training and
salience methods in Section 2. The methods for interpreting
AT-CNNS are described in Section 3. Then we present the
experimental results to support our findings in Section 4.
The related works and discussions are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminary
2.1. Adversarial training
This training method was first proposed by (Goodfellow
et al., 2014), which is the most successful approach for
building robust models so far for defending adversarial ex-
amples (Madry et al., 2018; Sinha et al., 2018; Athalye et al.,
2018; Zhang et al., 2019b;a). It can be formulated as solving
a robust optimization problem (Shaham et al., 2015)
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
`(f(x+ δ; θ), y)
]
, (1)
where f(x; θ) represents the neural network parameterized
by weights θ; the input-output pair (x, y) is sample from the
training set D; δ denotes the adversarial perturbation and
`(·, ·) is the chosen loss function, e.g. cross entropy loss. S
denotes a certain norm constraints, such as `∞ or `2.
The inner maximization is approximated by adversarial
examples generated by various attack methods. Training
against a projected gradient descent (PGD, Madry et al.
(2018)) adversary leads to state-of-the-art white-box ro-
bustness. We use PGD based adversarial training with
bounded l∞ and l2 norm constraints. We also investigate
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) based adversarial training.
2.2. Salience maps
Given a trained neural network, visualizing the salience
maps aims at assigning a sensitivity value, sometimes also
called “attribution”, to show the sensitivity of the output
1Our codes are available at https://github.com/PKUAI26/AT-
CNN
to each pixel of an input image. Salience methods can
mainly be divided into (Ancona et al., 2018) perturbation-
based methods (Zeiler & Fergus, 2014; Zintgraf et al., 2017)
and gradient-based method (Erhan et al., 2009; Simonyan
et al., 2013; Shrikumar et al., 2017; Sundararajan et al.,
2017; Selvaraju et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2016; Smilkov
et al., 2017; Bach et al., 2015). Recently (Adebayo et al.,
2018) carries out a systematic test for many of the gradient-
based salience methods, and only variants of Grad and
GradCAM (Selvaraju et al., 2017) pass the proposed sanity
checks. We thus choose Grad and its smoothed version
SmoothGrad (Smilkov et al., 2017) for visualization.
Formally, let x ∈ Rd denote the input image, a trained
network is a function f : Rd → RK , where K is the to-
tal number of classes. Let Sc denotes the class activation
function for each class c. We seek to obtain a salience map
E ∈ Rd. The Grad explanation is the gradient of class
activation with respect to the input image x,
E =
∂Sc(x)
∂x
. (2)
SmoothGrad (Smilkov et al., 2017) was proposed to alle-
viate noises in gradient explanation by averaging over the
gradient of noisy copies of an input. Thus for an input x,
the smoothed variant of Grad, SmoothGrad can be written
as
E =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∂Sc(xi)
∂xi
, (3)
where xi = x+gi, and gi are noise vectors drawn i.i.d from
a Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2). In all our experiments,
we set n = 100, and the noise level , σ/(xmax − xmin) =
0.1. We choose Sc(x) = log pc(x), where pc(x) is the
probability of class c assigned by a classifier to input x.
3. Methods
In this section, we elaborate our method for interpreting
the adversarially trained CNNs and comparing them with
normally trained ones. Three image datasets are considered,
including Tiny ImageNet2, Caltech-256 (Griffin et al., 2007)
and CIFAR-10.
We first visualize the salience maps of AT-CNNs and nor-
mal CNNs to demonstrate that the two models trained with
different ways are sensitive to different kinds of features. Be-
sides this qualitative comparison, we also test the two kinds
of CNNs on different transformed datasets to distinguish
the difference of their preferred features.
3.1. Visualizing the salience maps
A straightforward way of investigating the difference be-
tween AT-CNNs and CNNs is to visualize which group of
2https://tiny-imagenet.herokuapp.com/
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(a) Original (b) Stylized (c) Saturated 8 (d) Saturated 1024 (e) patch-shuffle 2 (f) patch-shuffle 4
Figure 1. Visualization of three transformations. Original images are from Caltech-256. From left to right, original, stylized, saturation
level as 8, 1024, 2× 2 patch-shuffling, 4× 4 patch-shuffling.
pixels the network outputs are most sensitive to. Salience
maps generated by Grad and its smoothed variant Smooth-
Grad are good candidates to show what features a model
is sensitive to. We compare the salience maps between AT-
CNNs and CNNs on clean images, and images under texture
preserving and shape preserving distortions. Extensive re-
sults can been seen in Section 4.1.
As pointed by Smilkov et al. (2017), sensitivity maps based
on Grad method are often visually noisy, highlighting that
some pixels, to a human eye, seem randomly selected.
SmoothGrad in Eq. (3), on the other hand, could reduce
visual noise by averaging the gradient over the Gaussian
perturbed images. Thus, we mainly report the salience maps
produced by SmoothGrad, and the Grad visualization results
are provided in the appendix. Note that the two visualization
methods could help us draw a consistent conclusion on the
difference between the two trained CNNs.
3.2. Generalization on shape/texture preserving
distortions
Besides visual inspection of sensitivity maps, we propose
to measure the sensitivity of AT-CNNs and CNNs to dif-
ferent features by evaluating the performance degradation
under several distortions that either preserves shapes or tex-
tures. Intuitively, if one model relies on textures a lot, the
performance would degrade severely if we destroy most
of the textures while preserving other information, such as
the shapes and other features. However, a perfect disentan-
glement of texture, shape and other feature information is
impossible (Gatys et al., 2015). In this work, we mainly
construct three kinds of image translations to achieve the
shape or texture distortion, style-transfer, saturating and
patch-shuffling operation. Some of the image samples are
shown in Figure 1. We also added three Fourier-filtered
test set in the appendix. We now describe each of these
transformations and their properties.
Note that we conduct normal training or adversarial training
on the original training sets, and then evaluate their general-
izability over the transformed data. During the training, we
never use the transformed datasets.
Stylizing. Geirhos et al. (2019) utilized style trans-
fer (Huang & Belongie, 2017) to generate images with con-
flicting shape and texture information to demonstrate the
texture bias of ImageNet-trained standard CNNs. Following
the same rationale, we utilize style transfer to destroy most
of the textures while preserving the global shape structures
in images, and build a stylized test dataset. Therefore, with
similar generalization error, models capturing shapes bet-
ter should also perform better on stylized test images than
those biased towards textures. The style-transferred image
samples are shown in Figure 1(b).
Saturation. Similar to (Ding et al., 2019), we denote the
saturation of the image x by xp, where p indicates the sat-
uration level ranging from 0 to∞. When p = 2, the satu-
ration operation does not change the image. When p ≥ 2,
increasing the saturation level will push the pixel values
towards binarized ones, and p = ∞ leads to the pure bi-
narization. Specifically, for each pixel of image x with
value v ∈ [0, 1], its corresponding saturated pixel of xp is
defined as sign(2v − 1)|2v − 1| 2p /2 + 1/2. One can ob-
serve that, from Figure 1(c) and (d), increasing saturation
level can gradually destroy some texture information while
preserving most parts of the contour structures.
Patch-Shuffling. To destroy long-range shape information,
we split images into k × k small patches and randomly
rearranging the order of these patches, with k ∈ {2, 4, 8}.
Favorably, this operation preserves most of the texture in-
formation and destroys most of the shape information. The
patch-shuffled image samples are showed in Figure 1(e), (f).
Note that as k increasing, more information of the original
image is lost, especially for images with low resolution.
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Table 1. Accuracy and robustness of all the trained models. Robustness is measured against the PGD attack with bounded l∞ norm.
Details are listed in the appendix. Note that underfitting CNNs have similar generalization performance with some of the AT-CNNs on
clean images.
CIFAR10 TinyImageNet Caltech 256
Accuracy Robustness Accuracy Robustness Accuracy Robustness
PGD-inf: 8 86.27 44.81 54.42 14.25 66.41 31.16
PGD-inf: 4 89.17 30.85 61.85 6.87 72.22 20.10
PGD-inf: 2 91.4 39.11 67.06 1.66 76.51 7.51
PGD-inf: 1 93.40 7.53 69.42 0.18 79.11 1.70
PGD-L2: 12 85.79 34.61 53.44 14.80 65.54 31.36
PGD-L2: 8 88.01 26.88 58.21 10.03 69.75 26.19
PGD-L2: 4 90.77 13.19 64.24 3.61 74.12 14.33
FGSM: 8 84.90 34.25 66.21 0.01 70.88 20.02
FGSM: 4 88.13 25.08 63.43 0.13 73.91 15.16
Normal 94.52 0 72.02 0.01 83.32 0
Underfit 86.79 0 60.05 0.01 69.04 0
4. Experiments and analysis
Experiments setup We describe the experiment setup to
evaluate the performance of AT-CNNs and standard CNNs
in data distributions manipulated by above-mentioned opera-
tions. We conduct experiments on three datasets. CIFAR-10,
Tiny ImageNet and Caltech-256 (Griffin et al., 2007). Note
that we do not create the style-transferred and patch-shuffled
test set for CIFAR-10 due to its limited resolution.
When training on CIFAR-10, we use the ResNet-18
model (He et al., 2016a;b); for data augmentation, we per-
form zero paddings with width as 4, horizontal flip and
random crop.
Tiny ImageNet has 200 classes of objects. Each class has
500 training images, 50 validation images, and 50 test im-
ages. All images from Tiny ImageNet are of size 64× 64.
We re-scale them to 224×224 and perform random horizon-
tal flip and per-image standardization as data augmentation.
Caltech-256 (Griffin et al., 2007) consists of 257 object
categories containing a total of 30607 images. Resolution
of images from Caltech is much higher compared with the
above two datasets. We manually split 20% of images as
the test set. We perform re-scaling and random cropping
following (He et al., 2016a). For both Tiny ImageNet and
Caltech-256, we use ResNet-18 model as the network archi-
tecture.
Compared models, their generalization and robustness.
For all above three datasets, we train three types of AT-
CNNs, they mainly differ in the way of generating adver-
sarial examples: FGSM, PGD with bounded l∞ norm and
PGD with bounded l2 norm, and for each attack method we
train several models under different attack strengths. Details
are listed in the appendix. To understand whether the differ-
ence of performance degradation for AT-CNNs and standard
CNNs is due to the poor generalization (Schmidt et al., 2018;
Tsipras et al., 2018) of adversarial training, we also compare
the AT-CNNs with an underfitting CNN (trained over clean
data) with similar generalization performance as AT-CNNs.
We train 11 models on each dataset. Their generalization
performance on clean data, and robustness measured by
PGD attack are shown in Table 1.
4.1. Visualization results
To investigate what features of an input image AT-CNNs
and normal CNNs are most sensitive to, we generate sen-
sitivity maps using SmoothGrad (Smilkov et al., 2017) on
clean images, saturated images, and stylized images. The
visualization results are presented in Figure 2.
We can easily observe that the salience maps of AT-CNNs
are much more sparse and mainly focus on contours of each
object on all kinds of images, including the clean, saturated
and stylized ones. Differently, sensitivity maps of standard
CNNs are more noisy, and less biased towards the shapes
of objects. This is consistent with the findings in (Geirhos
et al., 2019).
Particularly, in the second row of Figure 2, sensitivity maps
of normal CNNs of the “dog” class are still noisy even when
the input saturated image are nearly binarized. On the other
hand, after adversarial training, the models successfully
capture the shape information of the object, providing a
more interpretable prediction.
For stylized images shown in the third row of Figure 2, even
with dramatically changed textures after style transfer, AT-
CNNs can still be able to focus the shapes of original object,
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(a) Images from Caltech-256 (b) Images from Tiny ImageNet
Figure 2. Sensitivity maps based on SmoothGrad (Smilkov et al., 2017) of three models on images under saturation, and stylizing. From
top to bottom, Original, Saturation 1024 and Stylizing. For each group of images, from left to right, original image, sensitivity maps of
standard CNN, underfitting CNN and PGD-l∞ AT-CNN.
while standard CNNs totally fail.
Due to the limited space, we provide more visualization
results (including the sensitivity maps generated by Grad
method) in appendix.
4.2. Generalization performance on transformed data
In this part, we mainly show generalization performance
of AT-CCNs and normal CNNs on either shape or texture
preserving distorted image datasets. This could help us to
understand how different that the two types of models are
biased in a quantitative way.
For all experimental results below, besides the top-1 accu-
racy, we also report an “accuracy on correctly classified
images”. This accuracy is measured by first selecting the
images from the clean test set that is being correctly clas-
sified, then measuring the accuracy of transformed images
from these correctly classified ones.
4.2.1. STYLIZING
Following Geirhos et al. (2019), we generate stylized ver-
sion of test set for Caltech-256 and Tiny ImageNet.
We report the “accuracy on correctly classified images” of
all the trained models on stylized test set in Table 2. Com-
pared with standard CNNs, though with a lower accuracy
on original test images, AT-CNNs achieve higher accuracy
on stylized ones with textures being dramatically changed.
The comparison quantitatively shows that AT-CNNs tend to
be more invariant with respect to local textures.
4.2.2. SATURATION
We use the saturation operation to manipulate the images,
and show the how increasing saturation levels affects the
accuracy of models trained in different ways.
In Figure 4, we visualize images with varying saturation lev-
els. It can be easily observed that increasing saturation levels
pushes images more “binnarized”, where some textures are
wiped out, but produces sharper edges and preserving shape
information. When saturation level is smaller than 2, i.e.
clean image, it pushes all the pixels towards 1/2 and nearly
all the information is lost, and p = 0 leads to a totally gray
image with constant pixel value.
We measure the “accuracy on correctly classified images”
for all the trained models, and show them in Figure 5. We
can observe that with the increasing level of saturation, more
texture information is lost. Favorably, adversarially trained
models exhibit a much less sensitivity to this texture loss,
still obtaining a high classification accuracy. The results
indicate that AT-CNNs are more robust to “saturation” or
“binarizing” operations, which may demonstrate that the
prediction capability of AT-CNNs relies less on texture and
more on shapes. Results on CIFAR-10 tells the same story,
as presented in appendix due to the limited space.
Additionally, in our experiments, for each adversarial train-
ing approach, either PGD or FGSM based, AT-CNNs with
higher robustness towards PGD adversary are more invariant
to the increasing of the saturation level and texture loss. On
the other hand, adversarial training with higher robustness
typically ruin the generalization over the clean dataset. Our
finding also supports the claim “robustness maybe at odds
with accuracy” (Tsipras et al., 2018).
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Figure 3. Visualization of images from style-transferred test set. Applying AdaIn (Huang & Belongie, 2017) style transfer distorts local
textures of original images, while the global shape structure is retained. The first row are images from Caltech-256, and the second row
are images from Tiny ImageNet.
Table 2. “Accuracy on correctly classified images” for different models on stylized test set. The columns named “Caltech-256” and
“TinyImageNet” show the generalization of different models on the clean test set.
DATASET CALTECH-256 STYLIZED CALTECH-256 TINYIMAGENET STYLIZED TINYIMAGENET
STANDARD 83.32 16.83 72.02 7.25
UNDERFIT 69.04 9.75 60.35 7.16
PGD-l∞: 8 66.41 19.75 54.42 18.81
PGD-l∞: 4 72.22 21.10 61.85 20.51
PGD-l∞: 2 76.51 21.89 67.06 19.25
PGD-l∞: 1 79.11 22.07 69.42 18.31
PGD-l2: 12 65.24 20.14 53.44 19.33
PGD-l2: 8 69.75 21.62 58.21 20.42
PGD-l2: 4 74.12 22.53 64.24 21.05
FGSM: 8 70.88 21.23 66.21 15.07
FGSM: 4 73.91 21.99 63.43 20.22
Figure 4. Illustration of how varying saturation changes the appearance of the image. From left to right, saturation level 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2
(original image), 4, 8, 16, 64, 1024. Increasing saturation level pushes pixels towards 0 or 1, which preserves most of the shape while
wiping most of the textures. Decreasing saturation level pushes all pixels to 1/2.
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(a) Caltech-256 (b) Tiny ImageNet
Figure 5. “Accuracy on correctly classified images” for different models on saturated Caltech-256 and Tiny ImageNet with respect to
different saturation levels. Note that in the plot, there are several curves with same color and line type shown for each adversarial training
method, PGD and FGSM-based, those of which with larger perturbation achieves better robustness for most of the cases. Detailed results
are list in the appendix.
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Figure 6. Visualization of patch-shuffling transformation. The first row shows probability of “cake” assigned by different models.
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Figure 7. “Accuracy on correctly classified images” for different models on patch-shuffled Tiny ImageNet and Caltech-256 with different
splitting numbers. Detailed results are listed in the appendix.
When decreasing the saturation level, all models have simi-
lar degree of performance degradation, indicating that AT-
CNNs are not robust to all kinds of image distortions. They
tend to be more robust for fixed types of distortions. We
leave the further investigation regarding this issue as future
work.
4.2.3. PATCH-SHUFFLING
Stylizing and saturation operation aim at changing or re-
moving the texture information of original images, while
preserving the features of shapes and edges. In order to test
the different bias of AT-CNN and standard CNN in the other
way around, we shatter the shape and edge information by
splitting the images into k × k patches and then randomly
shuffling them. This operation could still maintains the local
textures if k is not too large.
Figure 6 shows one example of patch-shuffled images under
different numbers of splitting. The first row shows the proba-
bilities assigned by different models to the ground truth class
of the original image. Obviously, after random shuffling,
the shapes and edge features are destroyed dramatically,
the prediction probability of the adverarially trained CNNs
drops significantly, while the normal CNNs still maintains
a high confidence over the ground truth class. This reveals
AT-CNNs are more baised towards shapes and edges than
normally trained ones.
Moreover, Figure 7 depicts the “ accuracy of correctly classi-
fied images” for all the models measured on “Patch-shuffled”
test set with increasing number of splitting pieces. AT-
CNNs, especially trained against with a stronger attack are
more sensitive to “Patch-shuffling” operations in most of
our experiments.
Note that under “Patch-shuffle 8” operation, all models have
similar “ accuracy of correctly classified images”, which is
largely due to the severe information loss. Also note that this
accuracy of all models on Tiny ImageNet shown in 7(a) is
mush lower than that on Caltech-256 in 7(b). That is, under
“Patch-shuffle 1”, normally trained CNN has an accuracy
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of 84.76% on Caltech-256, while only 66.73% on Tiny
ImageNet. This mainly origins from the limited resolution
of Tiny ImageNet, since “Patch-Shuffle” operation on low-
resolution images destroys more useful features than those
with higher resolution.
5. Related work and discussion
Interpreting AT-CNNs. Recently there are some relevant
findings indicating that AT-CNNs learn fundamentally differ-
ent feature representations than standard classifiers. Tsipras
et al. (2018) showed that sensitivity maps of AT-CNNs in
the input space align well with human perception. Addi-
tionally, by visualizing large-ε adversarial examples against
AT-CNNs, it can be observed that the adversarial examples
could capture salient data characteristics of a different class,
which appear semantically similar to the images of the differ-
ent class. Dong et al. (2017) leveraged adversarial training
to produce a more interpretable representation by visualiz-
ing active neurons. Compared with Tsipras et al. (2018) and
Dong et al. (2017), we have conducted a more systematical
investigation for interpreting AT-CNNs. We construct three
types of image transformation that can largely change the
textures while preserving shape information (i.e. stylizing
and saturation), or shatter the shape/edge features while
keeping the local textures (i.e. patch-shuffling). Evaluating
the generalization of AT-CNNs over these designed datasets
provides a quantitative way to verify and interpret their
strong shape-bias compared with normal CNNs.
Insights for defensing adversarial examples. Based on
our investigation over the AT-CNNs, we find that the ro-
bustness towards adversarial examples is correlated with
the capability of capturing long-range features like shapes
or contours. This naturally raises the question: whether
any other models that can capture more global features or
with more texture invariance could lead to more robustness
to adversarial examples, even without adversarial train-
ing? This might provide us some insights on designing new
network architecture or new strategies for enhancing the
bias towards long-range features. Some recent works turn
out partially answering this question. (Xie et al., 2018) en-
hanced standard CNNs with non-local blocks inspired from
(Wang et al., 2018; Vaswani et al., 2017) which capture long-
range dependencies in a data-dependent manner, and when
combined with adversarial training, their networks achieved
state-of-the-art adversarial robustness on ImageNet. (Luo
et al., 2018) destroyed some of the local connection of stan-
dard CNNs by randomly select a set of neurons and remove
them from the network before training, and thus forcing
the CNNs to less focus on local texture features. With this
design, they achieved improved black-box robustness.
Adversarial training with other types of attacks. In this
work, we mainly interpret the AT-CNNs based on norm-
constrained perturbation over the original images. It is wor-
thy of noting that the difference between normally trained
and adversarially trained CNNs may highly depends on
the type of adversaries. Models trained against spatially-
transformed adversary (Xiao et al., 2018), denoted as ST-
ST-CNNs, have similar robustness towards PGD attack with
standard models, and their salience maps are still quite dif-
ferent as shown in Figure 8. Also the average distance
between salience maps is close to that of standard CNN,
which is much higher than that of PGD-AT-CNN. There ex-
ists a variety of generalized types of attacks, xadv = G(x;w)
parameterized by w, such as spatially transformed (Xiao
et al., 2018) and GAN-based adversarial examples (Song
et al., 2018). We leave interpreting the AT-CNNs based on
these generalized types of attacks as future work.
Figure 8. Sensitivity maps based on SmoothGrad (Smilkov et al.,
2017) of three models. From left to right, original image, sensitiv-
ity maps of standard CNN, PGD-l∞ AT-CNN and ST-AT-CNN.
6. Conclusion
From both qualitative and quantitative perspectives, we have
implemented a systematic study on interpreting the adversar-
ially trained convolutional neural networks. Through con-
structing distorted test sets either preserving shapes or local
textures, we compare the sensitivity maps of AT-CNNs and
normal CNNs on the clean, stylized and saturated images,
which visually demonstrates that AT-CNNs are more biased
towards global structures, such as shapes and edges. More
importantly, we evaluate the generalization performance of
the two models on the three constructed datasets, stylized,
saturated and patch-shuffled ones. The results clearly indi-
cate that AT-CNNs are less sensitive to the texture distortion
and focus more on shape information, while the normally
trained CNNs the other way around.
Understanding what a model has learned is an essential
topic in both machine learning and computer vision. The
strategies we propose can also be extended to interpret other
neural networks, such as models for object detection and
semantic segmentation.
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A. Experiment Setup
A.1. Models
• CIFAR-10. We train a standard ResNet-18 (He et al.,
2016a) architecture, it has 4 groups of residual layers
with filter sizes (64, 128, 256, 512) and 2 residual units.
• Caltech-256 & Tiny ImageNet. We use a ResNet-18
architecture using the code from pytorch(Paszke et al.,
2017). Note that for models on Caltech-256 & Tiny
ImageNet, we initialize them using ImageNet(Deng
et al., 2009) pre-trained weighs provided by pytorch.
We evaluate the robustness of all our models using a l∞
projected gradient descent adversary with  = 8/255, step
size = 2 and number of iterations as 40.
A.2. Adversarial Training
We perform 9 types of adversarial training on each of the
dataset. 7 of the 9 kinds of adversarial training are against
a projected gradient descent (PGD) adversary(Madry et al.,
2018), the other 2 are against FGSM adversary(Goodfellow
et al., 2014).
A.2.1. TRAIN AGAINST A PROJECTED GRADIENT
DESCENT (PGD) ADVERSARY
We list value of  for adversarial training of each dataset and
lp-norm. In all settings, PGD runs 20 iterations.
• l∞-norm bounded adversary. For all of the
three data set, pixel vaules range from 0 1, we
train 4 adversarially trained CNNs with  ∈
{1/255, 2/255, 4/255, 8/255}, these four models are
denoted as PGD-inf:1, 2, 4, 8 respectively, and steps
size as 1/255, 1/255, 2/255, 4/255.
• l2-norm bounded adversary. For Caltech-256 &
Tiny ImageNet, the input size for our model is 224×
224, we train three adversarially trained CNNs with
 ∈ {4, 8, 12}, and these four models are denoted as
PGD-l2: 4, 8, 12 respectively. Step sizes for these
three models are 2/255, 4/255, 6/255. For CIFAR-10,
where images are of size 32× 32, the three adversari-
ally trained CNNs have  ∈ {4/10, 8/10, 12/10}, but
they are denoted in the same way and have the same
step size as that in Caltech-256 & Tiny ImageNet.
A.2.2. TRAIN AGAINST A FGSM ADVERSARY
 for these two adversarially trained CNNs are  ∈
{4, 8}, and they are denoted as FGSM 4, 8 respectively.
B. Style-transferred test set
Following (Geirhos et al., 2019) we construct stylized test
set for Caltech-256 and Tiny ImageNet by applying the
AdaIn style transfer(Huang & Belongie, 2017) with a styl-
ization coefficient of α = 1.0 to every test image with
the style of a randomly selected painting from 3Kaggle’s
Painter by numbers dataset. we used source code provided
by(Geirhos et al., 2019).
C. Experiments on Fourier-filtered datasets
(Jo & Bengio, 2017) showed deep neural networks tend
to learn surface statistical regularities as opposed to high-
level abstractions. Following them, we test the performance
of different trained CNNs on the high-pass and low-pass
filtered dataset to show their tendencies.
C.1. Fourier filtering setup
Following (Jo & Bengio, 2017) We construct three types of
Fourier filtered version of test set.
• The low frequency filtered version. We use a radial
mask in the Fourier domain to set higher frequency
modes to zero.(low-pass filtering)
• The high frequency filtered version. We use a radial
mask in the Fourier domain to preserve only the higher
frequency modes.(high-pass filtering)
• The random filtered version. We use a random mask
in the Fourier domain to set each mode to 0 with prob-
ability p uniformly. The random mask is generated on
the fly during the test.
C.2. Results
We measure generalization performance (accuracy on cor-
rectly classified images) of each model on these three fil-
tered datasets from Caltech-256, results are listed in Ta-
ble 3. AT-CNNs performs better on Low-pass filtered dataset
and worse on High-pass filtered dataset. Results indicate
that AT-CNNs make their predictions depend more on low-
frequency information. This finding is consistent with our
conclusions since local features such as textures are often
considered as high-frequency information, and shapes and
contours are more like low-frequency.
D. Detailed results
We the detailed results for our quantitative experiments
here. Table 5, 4, 6 show the results of each models on
3https://www.kaggle.com/c/
painter-by-numbers/
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Table 3. “Accuracy on correctly classified images” for different models on three Fourier-filtered Caltech-256 test sets.
DATA SET THE LOW FREQUENCY FILTERED VERSION THE HIGH FREQUENCY FILTERED VERSION THE RANDOM FILTERED VERSION
STANDARD 15.8 16.5 73.5
UNDERFIT 14.5 17.6 62.2
PGD-l∞: 71.1 3.6 73.4
test set with different saturation levels. Table 8, 7 list all
the results of each models on test set after different path-
shuffling operations.
E. Additional Figures
We show additional sensitive maps in Figure 9. We also
compare the sensitive maps using Grad and SmoothGrad
in Figure 10.
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Table 4. “Accuracy on correctly classified images” for different models on saturated Caltech-256 test set. It is easily observed AT-CNNs
are much more robust to increasing saturation levels on Caltech-256.
SATURAION LEVEL 0.25 0.5 1 4 8 16 64 1024
STANDARD 28.62 57.45 85.20 90.13 65.37 42.37 23.45 20.03
UNDERFIT 31.84 63.36 90.96 84.51 57.51 38.58 26.00 23.08
PGD-l∞: 8 32.84 53.47 82.72 86.45 70.33 61.09 53.76 51.91
PGD-l∞: 4 31.99 57.74 85.18 87.95 70.33 58.38 48.16 45.45
PGD-l∞: 2 32.99 60.75 87.75 89.35 68.78 51.99 40.69 37.83
PGD-l∞: 1 32.67 61.85 89.36 90.18 69.07 50.05 37.98 34.80
PGD-l2: 12 31.38 53.07 82.10 83.89 67.06 58.51 52.45 50.75
PGD-l2: 8 32.82 56.65 85.01 86.09 68.90 58.75 51.59 49.30
PGD-l2: 4 32.82 58.77 86.30 86.36 67.94 53.68 44.43 41.98
FGSM: 8 29.53 55.46 85.10 86.65 69.01 55.64 45.92 43.42
FGSM: 4 32.68 59.37 87.22 87.90 66.71 51.13 41.66 38.78
Table 5. “Accuracy on correctly classified images” for different models on saturated Tiny ImageNet test set. It is easily observed AT-CNNs
are much more robust to increasing saturation levels on Tiny ImageNet.
SATURAION LEVEL 0.25 0.5 1 4 8 16 64 1024
STANDARD 7.24 25.88 72.52 72.73 25.38 8.24 2.62 1.93
UNDERFIT 7.34 25.44 69.80 60.67 18.01 6.72 3.16 2.65
PGD-l∞: 8 11.07 29.08 67.11 74.53 49.8 40.16 35.44 33.96
PGD-l∞: 4 12.44 33.53 72.94 75.75 46.38 32.12 24.92 22.65
PGD-l∞: 2 12.09 34.85 75.77 76.15 41.35 25.20 16.93 14.52
PGD-l∞: 1 11.30 35.03 76.85 78.63 40.48 21.37 12.70 10.81
PGD-l2: 12 11.30 29.48 66.94 75.22 52.26 42.11 37.20 35.85
PGD-l2: 8 12.42 32.78 71.94 75.15 47.92 35.66 29.55 27.90
PGD-l2: 4 12.63 34.10 74.06 77.32 45.00 28.73 20.16 18.04
FGSM: 8 12.59 32.66 70.55 81.53 41.83 17.52 7.29 5.82
FGSM: 4 12.63 34.10 74.06 75.05 42.91 29.09 22.15 20.14
Table 6. “Accuracy on correctly classified images” for different models on saturated CIFAR-10 test set. It is easily observed AT-CNNs are
much more robust to increasing saturation levels on CIFAR-10.
SATURAION LEVEL 0.25 0.5 1 4 8 16 64 1024
STANDARD 27.36 55.95 91.03 93.12 69.98 48.30 34.39 31.06
UNDERFIT 21.43 50.28 87.71 89.89 66.09 43.35 29.10 26.13
PGD-l∞: 8 26.05 46.96 80.97 89.16 75.46 69.08 58.98 64.64
PGD-l∞: 4 27.22 49.81 84.16 89.79 73.89 65.35 59.99 58.47
PGD-l∞: 2 28.32 53.12 86.93 91.37 74.02 62.82 55.25 52.60
PGD-l∞: 1 27.18 53.59 88.54 91.77 72.67 58.39 47.25 41.75
PGD-l2: 12 25.99 46.92 81.72 88.44 73.92 66.03 60.98 59.41
PGD-l2: 8 27.75 50.29 83.76 80.92 73.17 64.83 58.64 46.94
PGD-l2: 4 27.26 51.17 85.78 90.08 73.12 61.50 52.04 48.79
FGSM: 8 25.50 46.11 81.72 87.67 74.22 67.12 62.51 61.32
FGSM: 4 26.39 58.93 84.30 89.02 73.47 64.43 58.80 56.82
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Table 7. “Accuracy on correctly classified images” for different models on Patch-shuffled Caltech-256 test set. Results indicates that
AT-CNNs are more sensitive to Patch-shuffle operations on Caltech-256.
DATA SET 2× 2 4× 4 8× 8T
STANDARD 84.76 51.50 10.84
UNDERFIT 75.59 33.41 6.03
PGD-l∞: 8 58.13 20.14 7.70
PGD-l∞: 4 68.54 26.45 8.18
PGD-l∞: 2 74.25 30.77 9.00
PGD-l∞: 1 78.11 35.03 8.42
PGD-l2: 12 58.25 21.03 7.85
PGD-l2: 8 63.36 22.19 8.48
PGD-l2: 4 69.65 28.21 7.72
FGSM: 8 64.48 22.94 8.07
FGSM: 4 70.50 28.41 6.03
Table 8. “Accuracy on correctly classified images” for different models on Patch-shuffled Tiny ImageNet test set. Results indicates that
AT-CNNs are more sensitive to Patch-shuffle operations on Tiny ImageNet.
DATA SET 2× 2 4× 4 8× 8T
STANDARD 66.73 24.87 4.48
UNDERFIT 59.22 23.62 4.38
PGD-l∞: 8 41.08 16.05 6.83
PGD-l∞: 4 49.54 18.23 6.30
PGD-l∞: 2 55.96 19.95 5.61
PGD-l∞: 1 60.19 23.24 6.08
PGD-l2: 12 42.23 16.95 7.66
PGD-l2: 8 47.67 16.28 6.50
PGD-l2: 4 51.94 17.79 5.89
FGSM: 8 57.42 20.70 4.73
FGSM: 4 50.68 16.84 5.98
Figure 9. Visualization of Salience maps generated from SmoothGrad (Smilkov et al., 2017) for all 11 models. From left to right,
Standard CNNs, underfitting CNNs, PGD-inf: 8, 4, 2, 1, PGD-L2: 12, 8, 4 and FGSM: 8, 4.
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Figure 10. Visualization of Salience maps generated from Grad for all 11 models. From left to right, Standard CNNs, underfitting CNNs,
PGD-inf: 8, 4, 2, 1, PGD-L2: 12, 8, 4 and FGSM: 8, 4. It’s easily observed that sensitivity maps generated from Grad are more noisy
compared with its smoothed variant SmoothGrad, especially for Standard CNNs and underfitting CNNs.
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